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AGRO-INDUSTRY AND REGIONALISM IN tHE SOUTH WEST PROVINCE OF





The South West Province of Cameroon was born in 1972. lts birth marked the
end of a unique experiment in Africa whereby the political elite of two regions with
different colonial legacies-one French and the other British-had agreed on the formation
óf a federal state (Ardener, 1967; Johnson, 1970; Le Vine, 1971; Benjamin, 1972; Forge,
1981). Stark (1976) has convincingly argued that from its very start in October 1961,
federalism in Cameroon was more 'shadow than reality'. During the negotiations between
the two parties, it was already evident that the bargaining strength of the delegation from
the Francophone region was much greater than that of the Anglophone delegation.
Compared to the Francophone region, the size and population of the Anglophone region
was small, comprising only 9 per cent of the total area and 21 per cent of the total
population of the federation (Kofele-Kale, 1986). More important, at the time of the
negotiations, the former French Trust Territory of Cameroun was already ari independent
state, having been renamed the Republic of Cameroun, while the British Trust Territory of
Southern Cameroons was, by the terms of the United Nations plebiscite, still to achieve its
independence by joining the sovereign Republic of Cameroon. Capitalizing on this
'senior1 status of his region, Ahmadou Ahidjo, the then Prime Minister of the Republic of
Cameroon and leader of the Francophone delegation, was able to dictate the terms for
federation. Whereas John Ngu Foncha, then Prime Minister of Southern Cameroons and
Anglophone delegation leader, had proposed a loose form of federalism, which hè
regarded as a guarantee for equal partnership of both parties and for preservation of the
cultural heritage and identity of the Anglophone minority, Ahidjo eventually forced him to
accept a highly centralized form of federalism. Ahidjo, who was to become the President
of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, looked upon federalism merely as an unavoidable
transitory phase to the total Integration of the Anglophone minority into a strong,
Francophone-dominated unitary state (Chem-Langhee, 1995: 24). To achieve this
objective, hè employed several tactics (DeLancey, 1989: 52-65). One of these was to play
Anglophone political factions off against each other and eventually unite them into the
single party, the Cameroon National Union (CNU). Another was to eliminate from
positions of power any Anglophone leaders who remained strongly committed to
federalism, replacing them by others who favoured a unitary state. Still another was to
create 'clients' among the Anglophone elite. By granting top posts in federal institutions
and in the party to representatives of significant ethnic and regional groups in the
Anglophone region, hè tried to control these groups. Finally, he did not hesitate to repress
any Opposition. Through these and other tactics, hè succeeded in putting an end to the
federation. His justification for the 'glorious revolution of 20 May 1972' was that federalism
fostered regionalism and impeded economie development (Stark, 1976). The vast
majority of the Anglophones, however, did not attribute the emergence of 'regionalism'
and lack of economie development to federalism per se, but rather to the hegemonie
tendencies of the Francophone-dominated federal state. They soon began to resent their
regional loss of autonomy and their integration as a subordinate minority into the unitary
state. Their numerous grievances are mainly of a political, economie and cultural nature.
These grievances concern in particular their under-representation and inferior role in the
national decision-making councils, the neglect of the infrastructure and the exploitation of
the region's economie resources, and the attempts at 'frenchification'.
The creation of the South West Province in 1972 was closely connected to the
growing dissatisfaction of the Anglophone Community with this subordinate position. There
is no doubt that Ahidjo's decision after the 'glorious revolution' to divide the erstwhile
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Federated State of West Cameroon into two provinces, the South West and North ^
Provinces, was aimed at reducing the danger of any united Anglophone action against tf»«
Francophone-dominated state. In making his decision he was well aware of the internall
contradictions within the Anglophone community between the coastal/forest people (the
South West Province) and the Grassfield people (North West Province). One of the major
reasons for these internal conflicts is the loss of hegemony by the South West elite in the
Anglophone region. The coastal population had been exposed to early contact with
Western trade, religion and education, giving it a head start over the Grassfiejtt
population. An intelligentsia emerged in the coastal area, notably among the Bakweri, and
it quickly rose to the forefront in the nationalist struggle and dominated the Anglophone^
political scène up to the end of the 1950s. The transfer of power from the South
Westerner, Dr Emmanuel Endeley, to the North Westerner, Mr John Ngu Foncha, was a
political event with significant repercussions for South West-North West relations,
Following this transfer, the North West elite began asserting its presence. It soon became
ubiquitous in the higher levels of government and in high non-governmental positions. In
pre-empting for itself the choicest jobs as well as the best lands in the South West, it
provoked strong resentment among South Westerners to North West domination (Kofele-
Kale, 1981). Regional sentiments have been intensified by the fact that the
'entrepreneurial' North Westerners have gradually succeeded in dominating most sectors
of the South West economy, in particular trade, transport and housing (Rowlands, 1993).
Another source of the South West-North West divide was the UN plebiscite of 1961: on
that occasion, the South West showed considerable sympathy for alignment with Nigeria,
as opposed to the Cameroonian choice which prevailed, mainly on the strength of the
North West votes. A final source of tensions and conflicts is the massive labour migration
from the North West to the South West and subsequent settlement of North Western
workers in the South West. The lack of unity among the Anglophone elite and the severe
repression during the Ahidjo period largely precluded the Anglophone community from
openly expressing its grievances about Francophone domination until 1982, when Biya
took power. Following the relative liberalization introduced by the new president,
Anglophones began voicing their long-standing grievances. They not only protested
against inadequate Anglophone representation and participation at decision-making levels
of government, but they also addressed the more basic problem of the status of the
Anglophone community in the nation. In changing the official name of the country from
the 'United Republic of Cameroon' to simply the 'Republic of Cameroon' in 1984, the Biya
administration argued that Cameroon had become more united and moved ahead to
Integration. Anglophones protested that the new name implied they had no problems; they
also recalled that the new name was the same one Ahidjo had given to independent
Francophone Cameroon before reunification. Regional tensions in Anglophone
Cameroon were fueled when it became manifest that the president's ethnic group, the
Beti, were increasingly monopolizing political and economie power. Like his predecessor,
Biya attempted to divide the Anglophones. One of his strategies was to replace North
Westerners, who held key positions in the South West, by South Westerners. During the
economie and political crisis which arose in the mid-1980s, contradictions between the
Anglophone community and the Francophone-dominated state and between the South
West and North West were reinforced. The economie crisis and subsequent Structural
Adjustment Program (SAP) severely affeeted the private and public enterprises in
Anglophone Cameroon. The crisis was caused mainly by the dramatic fall of commodity
prices on the world market. However, Anglophones were inclined to attribute the crisis first
and foremost to the corruption and mismanagement of the Biya regime, which continued
to enjoy strong French support. Their greatest anxiety was that the few remaining
enterprises in their region would be either liquidated or sold to Francophone and French
business interests. Although the South West elite entertained similar fears, they were
equally opposed to a North West takeover of any important enterprises located in their




































































The political crisis was aggravated when an Opposition party, the Social
Democratie Front (SDF) was set up in Bamenda, the capital of the North West Province.
lts massive launching rally in May 1990 ended in the killing of six young Anglophones by
government troops. After this bloody event and the eventual legislation of a multi-party
system, the SDF's influence spread in Anglophone Cameroon, but the party proved far
more populär in the North West than in the South West, as the South West elite continued
to be suspicious of the aspirations of the predominantly North Western leadership of the
party. Interestingly, while the SDF claimed to be a 'national' rather than a 'regional' party,
evidenced by its growing Francophone membership, the military 'occupation' -of the
Anglophone region and brutalities towards its population led to the emergence and rapid
growth of several Anglophone pressure groups, including the Cameroon Anglophone
Movement (CAM) and the All Anglophone Conference (AAC). Most of them call for a
return to the federal state; a few extreme ones call for outright secession (Mehler, 1993;
Krieger, 1994). These movements have done much to foster unity among the Anglophone
elite. One reason is that for tactical reasons the North West elite has largely left the
leadership of these pressure groups to the South West elite.
The South West Province is the only region in Cameroon with a plantation
economy. This can be traced back to the German colonial era (1884-1914). Two agro-
industrial enterprises have long dominated the South Western plantation sector: one of
them is a parastatal, the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), and the other is a
private company, the Plantations Pamol du Cameroun Ltd, or Pamol, as popularly called.
These enterprises have contributed greatly to regional development, and are therefore
looked upon as the lifelines of the Anglophone region in general and the South West in
particular. The economie crisis brought both companies to the verge of collapse. Pamol
was put into voluntary liquidation by Unilever in October 1987 and has been up for sale
ever since. The CDC was first deprived of public grants and subsidies, and since 1994 it is
set for privatization. Control over both companies has become an issue raising regional
sentiments. It has again brought to the fore the contradictions between the Anglophone
Community and the Francophone-dominated state as well as those between the South
West and the North West.
THE LIQUIDATION AND SALE OF PAMOL ESTATES
The Plantations Pamol du Cameroun Ltd (Pamol) was previously a subsidiary of
the Unilever giant. Founded in the 1920s, it is one of the oldest agro-industrial enterprises
in Cameroon. lts principal estates produce palm oil and are situated in the Ndian Division
of the South West Province, an area bordering Eastern Nigeria (Courade, 1978).
Economically, the Ndian Division is one of the most important areas in the country: it
possesses large oil deposits at Idabato around Rio del Rey, as well as timber and oil
palms. Paradoxically, despite its natural riches, it continues to be one of the most isolated
and marginalized regions in the country. For a long time it was deprived of basic
infrastructural provisions. There was no road connecting it with other parts of Cameroon,
with transport occurring via a network of waterways (rivers, creeks, and sea). When a road
was finally constructed between Ndian and Kumba during the seventies, it was usually not
well maintained during the dry season and scarcely passable during the rainy season.
The area appears to maintain closer links with Nigeria than with Cameroon, with many
Nigerian fishermen, traders and peasants living in the area. Nigerian currency is still
widely in circulation and Efik is the lingua franca in the maritime areas of the division.
Legal and illegal trade with Nigeria is prominently visible and provides lucrative income
opportunities for some members of the local population. The main reason for the area's
marginalization seems to be political. During the inter-war period it was a kind of no-
man's land, in which the British authorities showed little interest. From 1945 onwards, it
was an integral part of the Kumba Division. Being rather far from Kumba, it continued to
be neglected by district authorities. It was not until 1967 that it was separated from the
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Kumba Division and declared an autonomous division by presidential decree. Still, hardly
any development funds were allocated to the new division. Actually, it was still being
penalized for the fact that during the 1961 plebiscite approximately 95 per cent of the
local population voted for Integration into Nigeria rather than reunification with
Francophone Cameroon. A few months before the plebiscite, one of its foremost leaders,
Mr N.N. Mbile, declared that his people were 'irrevocably [decided] never to accept union
with the Cameroon Republic'. 'If on this we shall have to be killed to the last man', he
pledged, 'it should rather be better that history records how a race of men died to the man
fighting for their freedom' (cited in Johnson, 1970:166). Following reunification, the Ndian
Division was never honoured with a ministerial seat in ttie Federal government. Lack of
national Integration was also manifest in the low profile of the single party in the area. A
few months before promulgation of the unitary state in 1972, the District Officer for the
Ekondo Titi Subdivision reported:
The response to the call for buying and owning the party card is still slow.
Meetings of cells and branches around the Headquarters have not been held and l
have no reason to believe that the organs in the remote villages are more
effective. l called up some of the people and asked whether they owned the party
cards and the answer they gave was amazing. They said since they do not travel
they see no need to own the cards. Only people who are mobile need the cards
because their kits are being inspected by the forces oflaw and order.
For the locaf population, Pamol was and still is the area's lifeline. It is feit that this
Company has realized what political rulers and regional barons have persistently failed in:
the promotion of regional development. It is the only private enterprise in the area that
employs a sizable labourforce, having in its heyday 3,000-3,500 workers. It is responsible
for 90 per cent of the Ndian Division's taxation revenue. It has constructed labour camps
with an adequate supply of water and electricity, hospitals, schools and roads. It has also
rendered transport services to its workers and the local population. Local people still
remember well that a Company launch, the M.V. Rio, with a capacity of 45 passengere,
was plying the Ndian-Lobe route three times a week. Last, but not least, the Company
stimulated from the early 1960s smallholders' schemes around its oil palm estates. Given
its significant role in regional development for many decades, the announcement of
Pamol's voluntary liquidation on 13 October 1987 caused a tremendous shock in
Anglophone Cameroon, and in the Ndian Division in particular. For those familiär with the
multitude of problems that beset the agro-industrial palm oil sector, however, the
liquidation did not come as a complete surprise (Konings, 1989). Agro-industrial
enterprises engaged in local palm oil production were poorly competitive on the world
market due to low productivity and high production costs. As a result, they were highly
dependent upon sales in the local market. From the early 1980s, however, they faced
enormous market problems, for two main reasons:
- Government expansion of this sector had effected a staggering increase fn
output. Particularly the huge expansion of the two parastatals that dominate the sector,
the CDC and the Société Camerounaise de Palmeraies (SOCAPALM), created the
unprecedented Situation that locally produced palm oil exceeded domestic demand by
about 40 percent.
- Government incapacity or unwillingness to control the Imports of cheap oils, especially
refined oil from Malaysia, led to a further reduction in the domestic demand for locally
produced palm oil.
Inevitably, these two factors gave rise to keen competition, and even a price war,
between Cameroonian agro-industrial enterprises in the domestic market, which forced
prices down to a leve! far below production costs and the government-recommended
price. In the end, most could no longer avoid selling an increasing volume of palm oil on
the world market. These exports occurred at a time that a 40 per cent increase in the
value of the CFA franc against the US dollar had made locally produced palm oil even







































lowest level in fifty years. In a desperate attempt to rid themselves of their growing stocks
of perishable palm oil, Cameroonian agro-industrial enterprises were obliged to dump their
produce on the world market, resulting in major financial losses. In December 1986,
Unilever briefed the Biya government on the company's deteriorating financial position
and urged it to implement forthwith a series of protective measures for the ailing agro-
industrial palm oil sector - in particular an increase in domestic palm oil prices, the
imposition of a special tax on all Imports of edible oils, and the granting of export
subsidies. It complained once more that Pamol was unable to compete with the state-
subsidized parastatals, even though the Company was more productive and supplied
higher-quality oil than the parastatals. To end this Situation of unequal competition, it
requested the government to grant Pamol similar low-interest loan facilities to those the
parastatals enjoyed, to i m prove the roads leading to its estates and mill, and to render
every possible assistance in the construction of a refinery. The then Minister of Industrial
Development and Commerce, Mr Nomo Ongolo, rejected Unilever's request out of hand.
He gave the following reasons for his refusal: Being confronted with a serious economie
crisis after a long period of remarkable economie growth (Körner, 1987), the government
was less inclined to allocate extra funds to the ailing agro-industrial sector. Moreover, the
government was of the opinion that a giant multinational like Unilever should not call upon
the government for assistance during the crisis, but rather reinvest in Pamol a certain
Proportion of the substantial profits it had made in the country. Of course, one underlying
reason for his blunt refusal was that the enormous expansion of the parastatals had made
the government less dependent on multinational enterprises for the supplying of palm oil
to the local market.
It was, however, widely believed in Anglophone Cameroon that the hidden agenda
for his refusal was to engineer the closure of one of the leading private enterprises with
British connections in their region, as a further step in the emasculation of the regional
economie potential by the Francophone-dominated state. Some well-informed sources
allege that Mr Nomo Ongolo was also personally interested in acquiring a stake in Pamol,
for he knew very well that, following his disapproval of its request for assistance, Unilever
would decline to subsidize a Company which had incurred a loss of FCFA 1.3 billion
between 1984 and 1987, and rather prefer to wind up its activities in Cameroon. In July
1987, Unilever informed the government of its Intention to seil Pamol. The government, in
turn, immediately gave Unilever in very clear terms to understand that the state was not
going to take over the Company. Already burdened with the huge losses of the agro-
industrial parastatals during the economie crisis, it could not afford to buy Pamol,
especially since the company's debts amounted to about FCFA 4.2 billion and its
neglected estates and mill required costly refurbishment. Moreover, in view of the
economie crisis the government was no longer in favour of extending the role of the state
in the agro-industrial sector; rather, it had adopted a policy that the existing agro-industrial
parastatals should become self-sufficient and profitable and, in the event of failure, be
either liquidated or privatized (Tedga, 1990). In the end, it strongly advised Unilever to
seil the company to interested Cameroonian businessmen. Such a transaction would be a
major contribution to the realization of one of the principal objectives of the government's
'New Deal' policies: getting various sections of the Cameroonian elite to set up medium-
sized and large-scale plantations (Konings, 1993; Takougang, 1993).
Unilever accepted this advice. It soon entered into secret negotiations with a small
group of well-known North West businessmen, including Messrs Nangah, Ngufor, Buyo,
Kilo, Nuiouat, and Acha. This business consortium was given legal advice by Mr Sertdze,
a renowned lawyer in Bamenda. Unilever had come into contact with this group through
the mediation of the Pamol management staff, mainly composed of North Westerners.
Having a personal interest in an eventual North West takeover of the company, some of
these senior North Western managers continued to act as 'brokers' between Unilever and
the North West business consortium and to provide this group with vital Information on the
company's Situation. The North West group was well aware that any substantial
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Investment in the domestic agro-industrial palm oll sector was a very risky undertaking. It
justified its resolve to take over Pamol äs follows:
- It was motivated in the first place by 'regional' sentiments rather than by (short-
term) profit considerations. It was anxious to safeguard the employment of the company's
labour force, the majority of which originated from the North West Province.
- It was convinced that the company's precarious financial position could be
redressed in the long run provided that (l) the government wou ld implement at once all
the protective measures for the agro-industrial palm oil sector previously proposed by
Unilever, and (ii) the company would be thoroughly reorganized.
Eventually, Unilever decided to seil the company to the North West group
following the latter's agreement to take over Pamol's liabilities in the form of long-term
loans and to guarantee the payment of the workers' wages and termination benefits. A
contract was then signed between both. parties. It was this contract that raised regionalist
sentiments among the South West elite. As soon as the secret 'deal' between Unilever
and the North West group became known, the South West elite started to agitate against
the North West takeover of Pamol and appealed to the state to intervene on its behalf. In
a strongly worded petition presented to the Head of State, the South West elite stated
categorically that it would never allow its ancestral lands, which had been occupied by
Unilever for decades, to be 'colonized' and 'exploited' by North Westerners. It stressed
that a North West takeover of Pamol would inevitably strengthen North West domination
over the South West. It therefore made an urgent appeal to the state to annul the
contract between Unilever and the North West group and support an eventual South Wes_t
takeover of Pamol. This regional conflict painfully revealed the fragility of Ahidjo's
'hegemonie project' of national integration. In addition, the appeal of the South West elite
forced the Biya government to take a stand on this politically delicate issue, thus risking
being accused of serving specific regional interests rather than the national interest.
Initially, there appeared to be ample reason for government support of a North
West takeover of Pamol. The North West group had taken considerable risks in its
decision to buy Pamol in view of the precarious financial position of the enterprise and the
generally unhealthy Situation of the domestic agro-industrial palm oil sector. Despite the
severe crisis in the national economy, the group had been able to raise the substantial
capital resources required for the takeover of the company and its liabilities. Beyond any
doubt it possessed the 'entrepreneurial' and managerial qualities to run the company.
Furthejrnore, the takeover was in line with public policy of encouraging the various elite
groups, whatever their ethnic or regional origin, to invèst in medium-sized and large-scale
agricultural plantations in any part of the country. Furthermore, there appeared initially to
be no convincing reason for a positive response of the government to the South West
appeal for the annulment of the agreement between Unilever and the North West group,
precisely because that Opposition was largely based on regional sentiments. Nor was any
proof provided that the South West elite was capable of raising the necessary funds for a
take-over of Pamol.
The South West elite then launched a politica! offensive to strengthen its
bargaining position. It tried to impress upon the government that Unilever's decision to seil
the company to the North West group was unjust. Since Pamol was operating on South
West ancestral lands, Unilever should have invited the South West group to make the first
bid to purchase Pamol. It was also stressed that a close link existed between the
company's plantation activities and regional development. This link was more likely to be
preserved by a South West than a North West take-over. Finally, the government was
warned that a North West takeover would give rise to widespread political discontent in
the South West.
The effective mobilization of the regional elite was evidently a decisive factor in
the eventual success of the South West political offensive. After this demonstration of
unity and determination, the government did not dare to disappoint the South West, a

































































































agricultural resources (Ombe Ndzana, 1987). When the government finally announced
that the contract between Unilever and the North West group would be annulled, Unilever
decided on 13 October 1987 to put the Company into voluntary liquidation. lt had become
frustrated by government policies and it simply refused to renegotiate the sale of the
Company. Immediately after the Company had been put into voluntary liquidation, a
liquidator and a Committee of Inspection for the liquidation representing the principal
creditors, in particular the state and several banks, were nominated. The liquidator
appointed was Mr G.G. Mure, a Frenchman, who owned an auditing firm in Douala asso-
ciated with Coopers and Lybrand. He seemed to be well qualified for the job, as hè had
already been involved in liquidating several private and public enterprises in the country.
During his first meeting with the creditors on 3 November 1987, he presented a
Situation report on the company's liquidation. In this report hè argued that a public auction
of the Company assets would be a disaster for the Ndian Division in social and economie
respects. He therefore proposed to maintain and run the Company as an ongoing business
and to seek possible solutions to its long-standing problems before sei l ing it to a reliable
buyer. He claimed that his unorthodox proposal was both in line with the 1961 Companies
Act of Anglophone Cameroon, and feasible, as the Situation at Pamol had not yet
deteriorated beyond recovery. His proposal was approved by the creditors. This was a
significant event, for it was the first time in Cameroon that a Company chose to remain in
business while in liquidation. The liquidator assumed the function of Chief Executive of
the Company. He devised and implemented a series of measures to restore health to the
Company. He refused to pay accruing company and income taxes due to the treasury,
interests on bank overdrafts, and other liabilities, on the grounds that the company was in
liquidation. Together with the other agro-industrial companies, he entered into
negotiations with the government for a revitalization of the ailing agro-industrial palm oil
sector. Eventually he succeeded in persuading the government to raise the domestic palm
oil prices and to impose a surcharge tax on imported oils to protect local palm oil
production. As a result of these measures, the chances of Pamol's survival were
considerably enhanced. The liquidator then undertook to rehabilitate the estates.
Intensified efforts were made to replant the estates, to refurbish the mill, to improve roads,
and to buy new lorries for the transport of the produce. Unfortunately, the sale of palm oil,
the company's main source of income and Investment, remained problematic, as the
parastatals began undercutting prices once again. Pamol was thus confronted in the early
1990s with a severe liquidity crisis and was unable to regularly pay its workers.
Form the very start the liquidator had carried on negotiations for the sale of
Pamol. Several business groups and companies have shown interest in purchasing
Pamol. The most important are (i) the South West group, (ii) the Commonwealth
Development Corporation (COMDEV), and (iii) the liquidator's group. The South West
group was the first business consortium to inform the liquidator of its continuing interest in
buying the company. The group had meanwhile formed a company, the so-called
Cameroon Agro-industrial Company (CAMAGRIC), which aimed at take-over of Pamol.
lts chairman was Chief Mosah Allen Misembe, a businessman hailing from the Ndian
Division. Closely connected with CAMAGRIC were some long-established South Western
businessmen like Michael Atabong and Monango Williams, as well as some politicians
and bureaucrats who had moved into business more recently, such as Nerius Nomaso
Mbile and Sylvester Dioh. lts legal adviser was Dr Henry Enonchong. The company began
issuing shares at 25,000 FCFA each. According to well-informed sources, CAMAGRIC
was initially unable to raise more than 50 million FCFA, including 10 million FCFA from
its chairman. Obviously it was easier to mobilize the South West elite for a protest action
against a North West takeover of Pamol than for a risky capital investment in the
liquidated company. The purchase bid of CAMAGRIC was 500 million FCFA, which the
liquidator categorically rejected as not reflecting the true value of Pamol assets estimated
by the Hunting Technical Service of London at 5 billion FCFA. The liquidator in fact
continued to doubt CAMAGRIC's capacity to raise the huge capital resources needed for
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purchase of the Company, take-over of its liabilities, and refurbishment of its estates and
mill. The group tried all sorts of pressures, including aggressive letters and interviews,
requests for political Intervention, and the spread of tendentious and erroneous
information, to persuade the government to order the closure of Pamol, enabling the
group to buy the Company at the price offered. These pressures yielded no results. The
government seemed no longer inclined to intervene on behalf of the South West group.
Represented in the Committee of Inspection for the liquidation, the government seemed
to fully agree with the strategy of the liquidator: to restore the Company to some health
before selling it to a reliable and financially strong buyer. There is proof that some high-
ranking government officials of South Western origin were also connected with the South
West group and CAMAGRIC, albeit mostly behind the scènes. In 1988 a delegation from
this group led by Mr Ogork Ebot Ntui, the then Minister with Special Duties at the
presidency, met with the liquidator, informing him that they wanted to buy Pamol, with a
loan from BCCI, a bank regularly accused of maintaining close ties with the drugs 'mafia'.
Apparently, Mr Ogork Ebot Ntui was interested in turning Pamol into an Indian hemp
Company, and asked the liquidator to accept the post of personnel manager. Upon the
liquidator's refusal, hè used his ministerial powers to frustrate PamoPs activities. Company
lorries were held up for long periods at customs, and with the complicity of a bailiff at
Kumba, a number of them were even seized by the minister, who later offered them for
sale at a public auction.
A renewed attempt to buy Pamol was being undertaken by the South West Elite
Association (SWELA), which was founded in 1991. SWELA was an attempt to unite all the
existing elite associations in the South West, including CAMAGRIC, into one single
organization. lts leadership continually claimed that SWELA was a non-political pressure
group, the main aim of which was to promote the socio-economic development and
cultural revival of the South West Province. The South West was to be restored to its
'former glory' after being marginalized by the Francophone-dominated state and subjected
to 'Grassfield imperialism'. Clearly, fear of a renewed North West domination over the
South West was one of the underlying motives for the association's foundation. SWELA
came into existence after the launching of the SDF and the latter's subsequent expansion
into the South West. On several occasions, SWELA leaders, especially those closely
allied with the ruling regime, issued public statements blaming the SDF for acts of
violence and anti-government activities in the South West. SWELA is subdivided into
chapters representing different subdistricts. It holds annual conferences to plan
development priorities and evaluate past activities. lts planned development projects
include the improvement of infrastructural facilities neglected by the Francophone-
dominated state. They include the rehabilitation of Limbe harbour and Tiko airport, the
establishment of an Anglophone university at Buea, and the promotion of cultural festivals
in the region. SWELA also strives to establish South West control over the remaining
enterprises in the region, especially the oil refinery at Limbe and important agro-industrial
companies. Recently, splits have occurred in SWELA. The association has become
divided into: a group which maintains close links with the Biya regime and the ruling party,
the Cameroon People's Democratie Movement (CPDM), and often displays strong anti-
North West sentiments. This is why many people continue to see SWELA as a CPDM
appendage and a resurrection of VIKUMA - the Victoria-Kumba-Mamfe alliance
propagated in the mid-1960s by Walter Wilson Mbong to destroy 'graffi' domination over
the South West. This group is composed of the older and younger CPDM 'barons' like
Emmanuel Tabi Egbe, Peter Agbor Tabi, Joseph Takem, and Ephraim Inoni, as well as
important South West chiefs like Mola Samuel Endeley and Nfon Victor Mukete. It
opposes the return to the federal state advocated by the Anglophone pressure groups.
Like the CPDM government, it Champions the ten-state option, which would retain the
present Separation between the South West and North West Provinces and thus
safeguard South West autonomy-a group which is more critical of government policies








































condemned the military brutalities in the South West during the 1993 government anti-
smuggling campaign. It advocates closer cooperation between the South West and North
West as a necessary precondition for effective representation of Anglophone and South
West interests. It strongly supports the Anglophone demand for a return to the federal
state. SWELA wants to monitor the sale of Pamol and eventually buy the Company. Since
1993 it is urging its members to subscribe to shares at 50,000 FCFA each for the take-
over of Pamol. The Commonwealth Development Corporation (COMDEV) is another
serious candidate for the take-over. It offered 3.2 billion FCFA for the purchase of the
Company. The purchase would be made through a new Company to be created, the
Société d'Exploitation de l'Entreprise Pamol (S.E.E. Pamol). COMDEV was ready to
furnish the Company with a loan of 1.2 billion FCFA at a 9 per cent interest rate, repayable
over 10 years. The minimum capita! of the Company would be 1 billion FCFA. COMDEV
would subscribe to only 20 per cent of the share capital of the new Company. It has
committed itself to implement Company policy of promoting smallholders' schemes. This
would lead by the year 2000 to 60 per cent palm oil production by smallholders. It has
also promised to construct a refinery with a minimum capacity of 20 tons a day. At one
stage of the negotiations, the Meridian Bank International, whose General Manager is
president of the Inspection Committee for the liquidation, proposed a joint venture:
COMDEV 20 per cent, Meridian Bank International 40 per cent, and Palma Limited
Company 40 per cent, the last being a holding Company whose shareholders would be (i)
Pamol staff, (ii) smallholders interested in the future of Pamol, and (iii) Cameroonian
businessmen from all quarters. In September 1993, Pamol workers and managerial staff
announced that they had more confidence in COMDEV than in SWELA, because of
COMDEV's international reputation, proven financial background and experience in the
management of companies and plantations in Africa, including Cameroon. That Pamol
workers and managers preferred COMDEV to SWELA is not altogether surprising, since
most of them hail from the North West Province. However, l found that South Western
workers, too, had more faith in COMDEV than in SWELA. All Pamol workers and
management staff stressed that the English-speaking origin of COMDEV was an
additional reason to welcome its take-over of Pamol. Unlike the French, the British were
not out to dominate Anglophone Cameroon. Moreover, the English-speaking business
culture fitted well in Anglophone Cameroon.
Apparently the liquidator, too, became interested in purchasing the revitalized
Company within the conditions spelt out by COMDEV. To this end, hè appears to have
formed a consortium of Cameroonian Investors with solid international backing.
Remarkably, however, Pamol workers and managerial staff in September 1993 strongly
rejected the presence of the liquidator in any group of prospective buyers 'in view of his
gross mismanagement of the Company in liquidation'. This is a clear expression of their
striking change of attitude towards the liquidator during his tenure of office. The liquidator
was once hailed as the 'saviour of Pamol' and commanded great respect among the
workers. When the initial euphoria about the company's possible survival was over and
Pamol starled to face liquidity problems, workers and managers alike became
increasingly disgruntled with the liquidator's behaviour. The liquidator turned o'ut to be
extremely arrogant and authoritarian. Contrary to the Unilever style of management, hè
was in the habit of treating even the most senior managers with disdain bordering on
contempt; and fotlowing the renewed deterioration in the company's Situation, he refused
to consult any of them. His French nationality, too, became increasingly problematic after
the Biya regime had fuelled existing contradictions between Francophones and
Anglophones (Gaillard, 1992). His appointment was now perceived retroactively as yet
another example of Francophone domination over the Anglophone region. Pamol workers
and managers strongly resented the liquidator's poor command of the English language.
They were infuriated when hè created the Impression that hè preferred Francophone to
Anglophone managers. He recruited a dozen well-paid Francophone graduates to
understudy the Anglophone managers in order to eventually take over the latter's
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responsibilities. This led to considerable confusion in the existing chain of command and
fierce conflicts between the Anglophone managers and the liquidator and his
Francophone graduates.
There was, moreover, a general consensus within the Company that the reward for
the liquidator's services was out of proportion to the income of even the most senior
managers. Without consultation hè appears to have rewarded himself fees and
allowances amounting to 430 million FCFA during his 5.5-year tenure of office (October
1987-May 1993), even though hè spent most of his time in Douala where he lived and ran
his auditing firm. He commuted between Douala and Pamol headquarters at Lobe once or
twice a week by chartered plane, costing the Company more than 1 million FCFA per
return trip. Little wonder that many people inside and outside the Company believed hè
was not eager to seil the Company because of his vested interest in the continuation of the
liquidation. Furthermore, there is no doubt that his close contacts with the Biya regime
were widely resented in the Company. Several informants told me that the liquidator was
given to boast about his connections with high-ranking officials right up to the presidency.
They also alleged that hè dipped his hand into Company coffers to ensure Biya's re-
election in the presidential elections in 1992: hè is said to have provided the South
Western Minister John Ebong Ngolle, a close friend, with a new Pajero and a substantial
sum to allow him to campaign for Biya in the South West Province. Understandably, his
well-known contacts with the Biya regime did not endear him to the company's workers
and managerial staff, the vast majority of whom supported the candidature of John Fru
Ndi, chairman of the SDF, during the presidential elections. It is reported that after Biya's
victory in the fraudulent elections, the liquidator led a group of Biya loyalists to the house
of Dr l.N. Timti, a North Western manager, on what hè described as a 'condolence'
mission. On that occasion hè is alleged to have said, 'Please, accept my sympathy that
your leader has lost the elections, so you will not replace me as the company's General
Manager'. These factors, together with the liquidator's inability to pay the workers during
the company's severe liquidity crisis in 1992/93, led the workers to embark on a two-
month strike on 10 March 1993. On that fateful day, the liquidator barely escaped from
being lynched by the workers, being rescued just in time from his hiding place on the
estate by the military .
On 26 April 1993, the Committee of Inspection for the liquidation resolved it would
thenceforth take over responsibility for the liquidation. The Mundemba High Court first
suspended the liquidator from duty on 4 May 1993 and later dismissed him on 15
November 1993. On 8 May 1993, the Committee of Inspection created a local
management committee led by Dr l.N. Timti to run the Company. The liquidator's
prediction that the Company would crumble after his departure has not yet materialized. It
is still alive though it continues to face formidable liquidity problems. In these
circumstances, it is unlikely that a reliable buyer can be found.
STATE WITHDRAWAL AND PRIVATIZATION OF THE CDC
The CDC is the largest agro-industrial enterprise in Cameroon. It is the country's
second largest employer of labour, surpassed only by the government. It formerly
employed 25,000 workers. At present it still employs about 15,000 permanent workers and
a few thousand seasonal and casual ones. It is one of the few agro-industrial enterprises
in the world that specialize in a variety of crops, its four major crops being rubber, palm
oil, tea and bananas. The CDC was founded in 1946, but its roots can be traced back to
the German colonial period (1884-1914) (Ardener et al. 1960; Epale, 1985; Konings,
1993). During that period many large-scale private plantations were created in the present
South West Province, particularly on the fertile, volcanic soils in the area around Mount
Cameroon. The establishment of a plantation economy in the region led to the expulsion
of the original occupants of the land, notably the Bakweri, into prescribed restricted native
















































expropriated by the British. After the war, a decision had to be reached on how to dispose
of the expropriated estate lands. The educated Bakweri elite, organized in the so-called
Bakweri Land Committee, immediately began agitating for retrieval of its ancestral lands.
It sent several petitions, first to the British Crown, and subsequently to the United Nations.
The British authorities ignored the Bakweri claims and eventually decided to form a public
enterprise, the CDC, which was charged with development and management of the ex-
German estate lands for the benefit of the people of the Trusteeship territory. It was also
to provide for the spiritual, educational and social welfare of its employees. Any profit
realized after the Corporation had met its statutory obligations, discharged its normal
functions, and placed in reserve such sums as might be required for effectively running
the enterprise, was to be paid to the public authorities for the purpose of developing the
Trusteeship territory.
Some students of plantation agriculture, such as G. Beckford (1972), have
blamed the persistent poverty and underdevelopment of Third World economies on this
mode of production. In the case of the CDC, however, this thesis finds little support, for
the corporation has been a major instrument of modernization and is largely credited with
whatever socioeconomic development has occurred in Anglophone Cameroon. It has
created employment for many men and women. It has constructed numerous roads. It has
supplied water and electricity. It has built and staffed schools. It has awarded a substantial
number of scholarships. It has provided medical care for a relatively large proportion of
the local population. It has stimulated the supply of goods and services to itself and its
workers. And it has played an important role in the commercialization and modernization
of peasant production - as an intermediary in marketing the Bakweri peasantry's banana
production during the fifties (Ardener, 1958; Geschiere, 1995) and in the establishment of
regional smallholders' oil palm and rubber schemes from the early sixties (Konings, 1993).
As a result, the CDC has often been called the economie lifeline of Anglophone
Cameroon. In 1960, one year before Cameroonian reunification, an important change
took place in the management of the corporation. COMDEV took over the management of
the corporation and invested 1 million pounds in it. It managed the corporation until 1974,
when a North Westerner, Mr J.N. Ngu, was appointed General Manager. Following
reunification, one may observe „increasing Intervention by the Francophone-dominated
federal state in this Anglophone corporation, and an increasing dependence of the
corporation on foreign financial institutions for its modernization and expansion. In the
period 1967-87, the corporation expanded its cultivated area from about 20,000 to 40,000
ha with loans supplied ,by several external financiers, including the World Bank, the
International Development Association (IDA), the European Development Fund (FED),
COMDEV, and the (French) Central Fund for Economie Cooperation (CCCE). In
compliance with the terms of the external loans, the Federal state in 1966 began*
contributing to the corporation's equity share capital, which had formerly been divided
between the Federal State of West Cameroon and the West Cameroon Marketing Board.
The Federal Minister of Planning and Territorial Development became the corporation's
Supervisory Minister. In the wake of the promulgation of the unitary state, decree no.
73/597 of 28 September 1973 charged the corporation with a mission to contribute to
national development and announced a new Memorandum and Articles of Association
under which the CDC had to operate. One article made the United Republic of Cameroon
and the National Produce Marketing Board (ONCPB) the exclusive shareholders of the
corporation. In 1977 the government ordered the CDC management to expand outside
the South West Province, a further attempt to transform the CDC from a 'regional' into a
'national' corporation. As a result, the CDC now owns estates in the North West, West and
Littoral Provinces. Since 1982 the chairman and the general manager of the corporation
are no longer appointed by the CDC Board of Directors, but by decree. Strikingly, despite
these integrative efforts, the people of Anglophone Cameroon in general and the South
West Province in particular have continued to perceive the CDC as 'their' corporation.
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The CDC has been one of the few agro-industrial enterprises in Cameroon which
had generally positive operätional results, though these fluctuated over the years. As a
public enterprise it continued to receive large annual government subsidies and grants,
irrespective of performance: between 1981 and 1987 the CDC received approximately 93
million FCFA from the government. Similarly to other agro-industrial enterprises in
Cameroon, the CDC has suffered a severe economie crisis since 1986. In the three years
preceding the crisis (1983/84-1985/86), the corporation was still making substantial profits,
totaling 3.2 billion FCFA. The crisis, however, had a dramatic impact on the corporation's
financial Situation: during the period 1986/87-1990/91 it suffered a loss of about 18 billion
FCFA (Konings, 1995). The main reasons for this crisis have been mentioned above.
There have also been frequent reports of involvement by the managerial elite in massive
embezzlement, reckless expenditure, waste, and struggle for power often based on ethnic
and regional considerations.
The South West-North West divide, in fact, has often paralyzed the corporation's
administration. Since reunification, the chairman of the CDC Board of Directors has
usually been a South Westerner. Prominent SWELA members like Nfon V. Mukete, Chief
S. Endeley, and Messrs John Ebong Ngolle and Nerius Nomaso Mbile have occupied this
Position. The daily management of the corporation, however, has been dominated by
North Westerners. The appointment of the North Westerner, Mr J.N. Ngu, as the CDC
General Manager occurred on the 'advice' of the corporation's external financiers, but it
was strongly resented by the South Western managerial elite. First, there were also
suitable South Western candidates for this post, particularly Mr l.N. Malafa who used to
be senior to Mr Ngu in the corporation's hierarchy, having served as the Deputy General
Manager during the last years of COMDEV management. Second, the South Western
managerial elite feared that Ngu's appointment would reinforce North West domination
over the CDC management. Ngu's thirteen years of office have been marked by strong
anti-North West feelings, hè himself being regularly accused by the South Western
managerial elite of favouring his own 'countrymen'. Ngu's severe conflicts with two of the
South Western chairmen of the CDC, Nfon V. Mukete and Chief S. Endeley, have
become almost legendary.
When Biya starled to appoint some South Westerners to key positions in the
South West to reduce hlorth West 'domination' and to achieve 'regional balance', his
friend Ngu was replaced in 1988 by Mr Peter Mafany Musonge, a Bakweri. Ngu was then
appointed Minister of Agriculture, a post which, incidentally, had meanwhile become
Supervisory Minister of the CDC.-In this capacity, Ngu continued to interfere in the CDC,
denying his successor the freedom to discharge his duties. The South Western
managerial elite alleged that Ngu was using his 'brothers' among the management staff to
pester or even to get rid of Musonge. Together with other sections of the South Western
elite, they put constant pressure upon Musonge to reduce North West influence in the
corporation. Particularly after the foundation of the SDF, SWELA and the Bakweri elite
urged Musonge to sack those North Western managers 'suspected' of being SDF
supporters. In a strongly worded petition, the Bakweri Elite Youth Wing declared in July
1991: This is a reminder of an earlier letter to you this year in which we requested you to
support our fight against SDF and their 'Graffi' domination that has caused the Bakweri
people to be deprived of what belongs to them. Mola, you have to redundant the
following 'grasslanders' who are strong supporters of SDF. They are Mr Ngeh F., Chie W.,
Tatani, Ndenesho, and Fomuso. Do this now. We are behind you. You are also supported
by Chief Justice S.M.L. Endeley and all Vikumas.
Without any doubt, these internal conflicts within the CDC management impeded
management capacity to combat the economie crisis. Managerial problems were
aggravated by the fact that the government was no longer prepared to render any
financial assistance to the ailing parastatal. To save the Company from total collapse, the
management and the trade unions on the CDC estates agreed to adopt a series of










































This manageriai strategy for economie recovery was reinforced in 1989/90 when the IMF-
and World Bank-inspired SAP demanded a restructuring of the parastatal sector. The
CDC management was then obliged to sign a four-year performance contract (1989/90-
1993/94) with the government (Tedga, 1990), under which the Corporation was expected
to achieve a set of objectives relating to plantation development, production costs,
quantity and quality of output, and personnel productivity. In return, the government wrote
off some of the corporation's debts amounting to 9 billion FCFA and exempted it from
payment of certain taxes.
The various adjustment measures brought some relief to the company's liquidity
Problems but, owing to the continuing decline in commodity prices, the company's survival
remained precarious. In June 1992, the Biya government, highly dependent on French
support and aid, managed to obtain a 7 billion FCFA low-interest loan for the ailing
Company from the French CCCE. Although this loan provided much-needed capital for
Investment purposes, the increased control of France over the Corporation was strongly
resented by CDC workers and managers, as well as by the wider public in Anglophone
Cameroon. It was rumoured that the CCCE was interested in taking over the management
of the CDC oil palm estates, and this again resulted in widespread protest in Anglophone
Cameroon. This regional outcry against the supposed increasing French control over the
corporation was in sharp contrast to regional sentiments about former and later transfers
of management of two major CDC crops to English-speaking companies. Few protests
were voiced in Anglophone Cameroon when the corporation entrusted management of the
banana sector to the American multinational, Del Monte, in 1987. Regional newspapers
even lauded the agreement signed between the CDC and COMDEV in late 1992,
stipulating that management of the corporation's three tea estates be transferred to
COMDEV for a period of 10 years. From 1992 onwards, persistent rumours were in
circulation in Anglophone Cameroon that the Biya government was about to either seil,
liquidate or privatize the CDC. While World Bank sources confirmed that the external
financiers were putting strong pressure on the government to do so, the government
continued to deny these rumours. On 15 July 1994, however, the government issued a
decree announcing the privatization or liquidation of a first batch of 15 public enterprises,
notably in the transport and agro-industrial sectors (Konings, forthcoming). The CDC was
one of the most conspicuous 'victims' of this decree. The announcement caused a great
commotion in Anglophone Cameroon. All existing parties, organizations and associations,
among them the SDF, SWELA, Chiefs, and Anglophone pressure groups such as the
CAM and the AAC seemed to forget their differences as they rallied in protest against
what they perceived as 'the attempt of the Biya government to seil this sizable
corporation, which has been for long the pride of Anglophone Cameroon, to France'.
Some also alleged that privatization was a 'plan of Biya to compensate his "tribesmen"
and allies with a slice of the parastatal cake'. One local paper claimed that the
government was offering the CDC 'at low cost to cronies'.
There were protest marches in the Anglophone towns. Protesters carried banners
with slogans as 'France: hands off Anglophones' and 'Hands off or we will burn the
plantations'. CDC workers went on strike, for they thought privatization would mean
retrenchment. A memorandum to Biya, cosigned by Anglophone pressure groups
including the newly created Southern Cameroons National Council, by chiefs and by
prominent local landowners, contended that the CDC was not for sale as (i) local
landowners, jn particular the Bakweri, had neither relinquished ownership of CDC land nor
received any royalties for the use of their land since the corporation's foundation in 1946,
and (ii) CDC workers had injected over 5.5 FCFA billion into the corporation as
compulsory savings during the crisis. In August 1994, the Biya government sent a
delegation composed of Anglophone ministers to the capitals of the two Anglophone
provinces to appease the population. They were jeered, however, and accused of wanting
to 'benefit from the spoils'. In Buea, the capital of the South West Province, they met an
assembly of the powerful association of South Western chiefs. Mola S. Endeley,
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Paramount Chief of the Bakweri and ex-chairman of the CDC, was spokesman for the
latter, and hè expressed to the delegation the region's bewilderment at being sacrificed on
the altar of 'uncontrolled liberalization'. Though close to the regime, he did not shrink from
protesting against the 'underground manoeuvres to deprive the local population of lts most
precious possession, land', emphasizing:
Our lands are not for sale. We are against the privatization of the CDC. Please,
hand over this message of the presidency to the republic. The privatization protest
movement was one of the recent developments in Anglophone Cameroon that made the
Biya regime painfully aware of the growing unity and determination among the
Anglophones in their struggle for redress of the marginalization and Subordination of their
region within the Francophone-dominated state.
COIMCLUSION
This paper has argued that the economie and politica! crisis in Cameroon has
reinforced existing regional sentiments among the South West elite. These regional
sentiments appear ambivalent, however. This is manifest in their struggle for control over
the two major agro-industrial enterprises located in the South West Province. At most
times, they tend to adopt an Anglophone identity and to resist any attempt of the
Francophone-dominated state to dismantle the Anglophone common colonial legacy.
Consequently, when rumours spread that the Biya regime intended to seil the few
remaining 'Anglophone' companies to Francophone or French business interests, they
rallied with the North Western elite in defence of the Anglophone patrimony. But as soon
as they suspect the North Western elite of being interested in establishing control over
economie resources in the South West, they are inclined to adopt a South West identity,
for fear of renewed North West domination over their province. Significantly, my study
provides evidence that, in the wake of the introduction of multi-partyism in late 1990,
Anglophone interests in general and South West interests in particular have not been
represented by the newly created political parties in the Anglophone region, but rather by
the emerging 'non-political' associations and pressure groups of the South West and
Anglophone elite. While personal animosities among South Western political leaders
formed a divisive element ifi the South Western political space, North Western political
leaders proved capable of founding a strong political party, the SDF, which soon became
the principal Opposition party in the country against the Biya regime, with a growing
membership in the South West. Nevertheless, it would appear that the SDF is now loosing
its initial appeal in Anglophone Cameroon. This is especially because the SDF gradually
came to present itself as a 'national' rather than a 'regional' party, and to adopt an
ambivalent, half-hearted stand towards the 'Anglophone problem' and the Anglophone
demand for a return to the federal state (Krieger, 1994). The positive response in both the
South West and North West Provinces to the 1994 actions by Anglophone pressure
groups in protest against the Biya government's privatization of the CDC demonstates that
the South West-North West divide has been reduced in recent years. With the exception
of those who continue to be co-opted in the 'hegemonie alliance' for private gains, the
Anglophone elite has become increasingly aware of the importance of common struggles
against the Francophone-dominated state. The brutal clampdown of the Biya regime on
the South West Province in 1993 was a decisive factor in drawing still hesitant members
of the South West elite into the ranks of the Anglophone pressure groups. At present,
many of them claim simultaneous membership of SWELA, AAC and other Anglophone
pressure groups. While some members of the South Western elite and chiefs, particularly
those closely allied to the regime in power, continue to Champion a 10-state federation
with a view to preserving their province's autonomy versus the North West Province, the
majority of the South West elite, like that of the North West, seems to be opting for a
return to the federal state. The Biya regime attempts to ignore the 'Anglophone problem'




















































affiliated organizations of having adopted secession of Anglophone Cameroon as their
goal. Biya has persistently refused to discuss any constitutional reforms for a return to a
federal state. The regime's arrogance and clumsiness on the issue, as well as its
increasing resort to repression, could lead to an escalation of Anglophone demands past a
point of no return.
NOTES
1. For the numerous Anglophone complaints, see, for instance, AAC, The Buea
Declaration, 2-3 April 1993, Limbe: Nooremac Press.
2. For a critique of some of the Anglophone complaints, see Kofele-Kale, 1986 and
Olinga, 1994.
3. See Buo, S.Kum, 'Biya and the Anglophones', West Africa, 12 August 1985, p. 1640.
4. Political Report on Ekondo Titi Subdivision for March 1972, by Mr Michael Nkamsi,
D.O., in: BNA, file Cd (1972)2, Political Reports on Ekondo Titi Subdivision. See also
Monthly Political and Economie Report for the Month of April, 1970, in: BNA, file
1969/1, Divisional Economie and Political Reports.
5. The Messenger, 14 October 1993, pp. 8-9.
6. Minutes of a Meeting with Labour Officials, Pamol Management, Staff
Representatives, Trade Unionists and the Administration to discuss the problems of
non-payment of salaries to Pamol workers, held in the Conference Hall of Korup
National Park on 8 March 1993, in: file MTPS/SWP/MND.49A/ol. 2, General
Correspondence -Plantations Pamol du Cameroun Ltd.
7. See, for instance, The Herald, 28 December 1993, pp. 1-2; and The Messenger, 9
Sep. 1993, p. 7
8. His propagation of this alliance led to his imprisonment in 1965 as well as the banning
of his newspaper, The Spokesman.
9. Report of the National Security at Ekondo Titi, dated 22 September 1993, in: file G
4002/49, Vol. 3, Pamol Cameroon Ltd -General Correspondence.
1 0.See Memorandum to the Chairman, Inspection Committee of Pamol, presented by the
workers of Pamol deliberating at Lobe on 16 Sep. 1993, Archives Pamol Headquarters,
Lobe.
12. The Messenger, 17 June 1993, p. 14.
1 S.The New Standard, 30 July 1991, p. 6.
14. See New African, no. 326, January 1995, p. 25; and Africa International, no. 279/280,
January-February 1995, p. 39.
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